Welfare and the locational choices of new immigrants by Madeline Zavodny
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New restrictions on immigrants’ eligibility
for welfare benefits will account for 44 percent
of the expected $55 billion reduction in federal
welfare expenditures over the next few years.
Most noncitizens are now ineligible for federally
funded programs, and states may restrict legal
immigrants’ access to other public assistance pro-
grams. States have the option to continue ex-
tending benefits to immigrants at state expense.
These changes have raised concerns that states
that continue to provide benefits to immigrants
risk becoming “welfare magnets.” In this article,
I examine whether differences in benefit levels
across states affect the locational choices of new
immigrants in an effort to determine whether
states that continue to offer benefits to immi-
grants will face an influx of immigrants.
The strictest restrictions in the 1996 wel-
fare law, which ends the guarantee of public
assistance to impoverished persons, are imposed
on immigrants. Most legal immigrants are auto-
matically barred from receiving food stamps and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which pro-
vides cash benefits to the disabled and elderly
poor. Future legal immigrants will also be in-
eligible for Aid for Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and Medicaid for the first five
years they are in the United States.
1 States have
discretion to determine noncitizens’ eligibility
for AFDC, Medicaid, and other public assistance
programs previously jointly funded by federal
and state governments.
2 Since the law was
signed in August 1996, thirty-six states have
promised to maintain AFDC benefits to immi-
grants already in the country, and four states
have said they will not do so.
The new welfare law affects a potentially
large number of immigrants. In 1996, 2 million
noncitizens received food stamps, 800,000
received SSI, and 640,000 received AFDC.
3 An
estimated 9.5 million legal, permanent-resident
noncitizens live in the United States, about 40
percent of whom are in California.
Some officials who believe that many immi-
grants came to the United States to take advan-
tage of public assistance are now concerned
that low-income households will migrate to the
states offering the highest benefits. Differences
in maximum AFDC payments across states are
already large—ranging from $923 a month in
Alaska to $120 in Mississippi in 1996 for a 
family of three—and will become larger when
immigrant eligibility rules vary across states. As
one policy analyst claims, immigrants are “quite
prepared to move. They already have.”
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Beliefs that immigrants have dispropor-
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vate much of the concern that immigrants move
to states with high welfare benefits. Economists
disagree about whether immigrants are more
likely than natives to receive welfare. Borjas
(1994) summarizes the literature. In 1970, immi-
grants were less likely than natives to receive
welfare, but by 1990 they were slightly more
likely than natives to receive welfare. Dif-
ferences in socioeconomic characteristics, such
as household composition and educational
attainment, account for the disparity between
immigrant and native welfare recipiency rates;
recent immigrants are less skilled than both
natives and previous immigrants. Immigrants 
as a whole are therefore more likely than
natives to receive welfare benefits, but immi-
grants’ recipiency rate is the same as that of 
similar natives.
Previous research suggests that differences
in welfare benefits across areas affect the loca-
tional decision of low-income households.
Blank (1988) finds that low-income female-
headed households are 12 percentage points
more likely to leave areas with low welfare pay-
ments and low wages than areas with high pay-
ments and high wages. Gramlich and Laren
(1984) find that households receiving AFDC 
that move are more likely to relocate to a high-
benefit state than to a low-benefit state.
Little research has been done on how 
welfare affects the locational choices of immi-
grants. Borjas (1996) concludes that immigrant
welfare recipients are more clustered in high-
welfare states than are other immigrants and
natives. The effect is particularly pronounced
among new immigrants, who may have lower
interstate migration costs than natives or earlier
immigrants. His findings are driven by Cali-
fornia, where 45 percent of new immigrants
who receive welfare live, versus 29 percent of
new immigrants who do not receive welfare, 12
percent of natives who receive welfare, and 10
percent of natives who do not receive welfare.
Buckley (1996) claims that the settlement pat-
terns of new immigrants are positively corre-
lated with state welfare generosity; this research
is discussed in greater detail below.
In this article, I estimate the determinants
of new immigrants’ destinations, focusing on
whether immigrants respond to differences in
the generosity of public assistance payments
across states. The results indicate that the loca-
tion of other immigrants is the primary determi-
nant of new immigrants’ destinations. However,
since earlier immigrants are clustered in high-
welfare states, it appears that new immigrants
are attracted by welfare generosity unless the
presence of other immigrants and constant
immigration patterns across states are con-
trolled for. In the next section, I summarize the
basic characteristics of immigrants’ locational
choices. I then discuss the results of an econo-
metric analysis of the determinants of immi-
grants’ destinations.
Immigrants are highly clustered . . . 
In the 1980s, the United States experi-
enced its greatest wave of immigration since the
turn of the century. More than 10 million per-
sons were granted permanent-resident status
between 1980 and 1992, including more than
2.65 million aliens who adjusted to legal status
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986. In 1990, almost 8 percent of the
population was foreign-born, a considerable
increase over the rate of 4.8 percent in 1970.
The immigrant population is highly con-
centrated in a few states. In 1990, almost 33
percent of the foreign-born population lived in
California; 14.4 percent lived in New York, 8.4
percent in Florida, and 7.7 percent in Texas.
Even though these are the four most populous
states, immigrants also make up a larger pro-
portion of the population in these states than in
other parts of the country.
New immigrants choose the same destina-
tions as previous immigrants, possibly because
the presence of a foreign-born population
attracts other immigrants. Six states accounted
for the intended residences of almost three-
quarters of new immigrants in 1992: California,
Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and
Texas. California alone was the intended resi-
dence of more than 34 percent of new immi-
grants in 1992. In addition to having a high
proportion of the population that is foreign-
born, these states have relatively high welfare
benefits, except for Texas and Florida (Table 1).
. . . and attracted to areas with
other immigrants
Previous research on the locational
choices of immigrants concludes that the pres-
ence of earlier immigrants affects the locational
choices of new immigrants. Using cross-
sectional data on immigrants from eleven
Western Hemisphere countries in 1987, Dunlevy
(1991) finds that the number of immigrants is
positively correlated with a state’s stock of
immigrants. Dunlevy also finds that immigrants
are attracted to urbanized states; he does 
not estimate the effect of welfare on settle-
ment patterns. Bartel (1989) finds that ethnic
stock is the primary determinant of male immi-4
grants’ location. In the cross-sectional data 
she uses, generous public assistance payments
also appear to attract male immigrants, a 
surprising result since single males and most
male-headed households are not eligible for
AFDC.
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In this article, I focus on the destinations
of immigrants from eighteen countries who
arrived in the United States in 1982 and 1992.
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These countries are the source countries of 
the majority of immigrants, accounting for 68.3
percent of immigrants in 1992 and 63.8 percent
in 1982. Mexico was the source country of 
the largest number of immigrants in 1992, and
Vietnam was the largest in 1982. The data do
not include new refugees but do include refu-
gees converting to permanent-resident status
and immigrants converting from illegal to legal
status under the IRCA; about 163,000 immi-
grants (primarily from Mexico) converted to
legal status under the IRCA in 1992.
The next section presents the empirical
model used to estimate the determinants of
locational choice. The model is based on indi-
viduals choosing the utility-maximizing location.
(See the box titled “A Model of Locational
Choice” on page 6.) I use the model to estimate
how state economic conditions and demo-
graphic characteristics affect the number of
immigrants “pulled” to a state; the model does
not focus on source country conditions that
might “push” immigrants to move because such
factors are likely to affect the number of immi-
grants who leave but not specific destinations
within the United States.
I use aggregate data on immigration levels
to the United States published by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The data are annual aggregate cross-tabulations
by destination state and country of birth for
major source countries. Individual-level charac-
teristics that are likely to influence locational
choices, such as education and occupation, 
are not available in the cross-tabulated data.
Therefore, I examine the effect of state-level
variables on the number of immigrants from a
particular country but cannot control for other
characteristics of those immigrants that might
affect the choice of destination. The next section
uses an analysis of covariance model to examine
the determinants of immigrants’ destinations.
The empirical model
In the general model estimated here using
ordinary least squares (OLS), the number of
immigrants is regressed on state-level economic
and demographic conditions, or
(1) Ijkt = a + Xkt – 1b + Fjkt – 1g + Djkd
+ Kks + Jjtr + hjkt,
where  j indexes the country of origin, k the 
destination state, and t the year (1982 or 1992).
The variable Ijkt is the number of persons immi-
grating from country j to state k in year t.
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The vector Xkt – 1 includes the unemployment
rate, per capita personal income less transfers,
the percentage of the population living in 
metropolitan areas, the per capita tax level, the
percentage of employment in manufacturing
and agriculture, and the maximum combined
AFDC and food stamps benefits available for 
a family of three in state k at year t – 1.
8 All 
monetary variables are deflated using the con-
sumer price index for urban consumers. The
covariates are lagged for two reasons: to avoid
the possibility of endogeneity bias, which is 
discussed in greater detail below, and to reflect
the information upon which immigrants are
likely to base decisions.
9 All the variables except
the unemployment rate and the tax level are
expected to be positively correlated with the
number of immigrants. The error term hjkt is 
corrected for heteroscedasticity.
Fjkt – 1 is the proportion of the state popu-
lation that was born in the same country as the
immigrant group. As discussed above, the pres-
ence of other foreign-born residents is a key
determinant of immigrants’ destinations. Immi-
grants are more affected by the size of the pop-
ulation from the same country of origin, not the
total foreign-born population. For example, 83
percent of Cuban immigrants in 1992 settled in
Florida, the state with the largest Cuban popu-
lation. The variable is available only in census
years, 1980 and 1990, during the sample time
frame. Because of the likely importance of this
variable, I examine in detail the sensitivity of the
Table 1
Concentration of Locational Choices
Percent of Percent of Maximum AFDC
immigrants foreign-born and food stamps
State in 1992 in 1990 benefits in 1991
California 34.6 21.7 $853
Florida 6.3 12.9 571
Illinois 4.5 8.3 629
New Jersey 5.0 12.5 671
New York 15.3 15.9 787
Texas 7.8 9.0 461
Other .6 3.5 624
NOTES: “Other” is the average of the remaining forty-two mainland states and the District of
Columbia. AFDC and food stamps are the maximum for a three-person family with one
parent.
SOURCES: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and U.S.
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results to including it; it is expected to be posi-
tively correlated with the number of immigrants.
Djk is the distance in miles between the
largest city in the origin country and the largest
city in the destination state.
10 The variable cap-
tures the psychological and monetary costs of
moving and is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the number of immigrants.
Fixed effects are also included in some
specifications. The state effects Kk control for
time-invariant characteristics assumed to be
equally attractive for all immigrant groups, 
such as climate and location. The vector Jjt
includes interactions of country and time effects
to capture any “push” effects from country j in
year t that are common to all states and any
changes in national immigration policy or 
the business cycle. When the fixed effects are
included, the estimated coefficients show 
correlations between changes in the number 
of immigrants and changes in economic 
and demographic variables within states and
countries of origin over time. Equation 1 is esti-
mated using data on the number of immigrants
from eighteen countries to the forty-eight main-
land states and the District of Columbia in 1982
and 1992.
This analysis offers several improvements
over previous research. By disaggregating the
data by country of origin, I can estimate the 
sensitivity of specific groups to differences in
welfare across states. I can also better estimate
the importance of the stock of previous immi-
grants in a location by using country-specific
data on the number of previous immigrants.
Time-invariant state characteristics can be con-
trolled for by including state fixed effects, the
importance of which is discussed below,
because two years of data are used. Buckley
(1996) uses panel data for the years 1985–91
but does not control for state fixed effects; he
also uses a linearly interpolated measure of the
stock of immigrants since only decennial data
are available. Linear interpolation automatically
makes the immigrant stock covariate correlated
with the error term, leading to identification
problems in Buckley’s results.
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The estimation results are discussed in the
next section.
The results
The estimation results clearly indicate the
importance of controlling for the stock of pre-
vious immigrants and for differences across
states and countries. When immigrant stock and
fixed effects are not controlled for, welfare pay-
ments are positively correlated with the number
of immigrants. As shown in the first column of
Table 2, a $1 increase in a state’s maximum
combined AFDC and food stamps payment is
correlated with an increase of three in the num-
ber of immigrants. As expected, higher income,
a more metropolitan population, and a more
agricultural economy are positively correlated
with the number of immigrants; the tax level is
negatively correlated with the number of immi-
grants. Surprisingly, a manufacturing-oriented
economy appears to discourage immigrants,
and a high unemployment rate appears to
attract immigrants. Many of these relationships
are not robust to using other specifications, as
discussed below.
Welfare payments are not correlated with
the number of immigrants when the percentage
of the population comprised of earlier immi-
grants from the same country is controlled for.
The estimated coefficient reported in column 2
implies that the number of immigrants increases
by almost 6,500 when the percentage of the
population from the same country increases 
by one point. The substantial increase in the
goodness of fit, as measured by the R-squared,
indicates the importance of other immigrants 
in determining locational choice. Agricultural
employment remains positively correlated with
Table 2
Determinants of Immigrants’ Destinations
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment rate 95.432 48.643 29.716 30.608
(37.605) (24.521) (47.761) (40.051)
Income .690 .270 –1.937 –.671
(.305) (.422) (2.023) (1.377)
Metropolitan population 21.300 2.356 –84.304 –82.828
(4.050) (6.022) (63.989) (57.329)
Taxes –.392 –.095 .106 –.862
(.137) (.226) (.348) (.707)
Manufacturing –13.170 15.832 –8.303 –19.931
employment share (4.854) (12.022) (22.371) (29.456)
Agriculture 849.604 346.170 –282.895 –252.222
employment share (316.976) (120.647) (301.400) (212.232)
Welfare 3.144 .955 10.891 5.703
(1.746) (.764) (6.954) (3.759)
Foreign-born population — 6.478 — 6.615
(*1,000) (2.482) (2.537)
Distance .008 .142 –.985 –.003
(.041) (.034) (.267) (.264)
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .060 .481 .187 .555
NOTES: The dependent variable is the number of persons immigrating from one of eighteen
countries to one of forty-nine states in 1982 or 1992, a total of 1,764 observations. See
the text for details of the data. Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are shown
in parentheses.6
the number of immigrants. The unemployment
rate and the distance from the country of origin
are positively correlated with the number of
immigrants, but these results are also sensitive
to the inclusion of additional controls.
None of the variables that reflect eco-
nomic conditions, including the welfare vari-
able, is well correlated with the number of
immigrants when fixed effects are included in
the regression. As discussed above, the state
fixed effects control for state characteristics that
are fixed over time and the country-of-origin
time effects control for factors that push immi-
grants to immigrate to the United States in a
given year and for changes in immigration 
policy. Only the distance between the country
of origin and the state is negatively correlated
with the number of immigrants when the 
foreign-born population is not controlled for, 
as shown in column 3. The foreign-born popu-
lation is the only variable well correlated with
the number of immigrants when it is included 
as a covariate, as shown in column 4.
The sensitivity of many of the estimated
coefficients to the inclusion of the fixed effects
indicates that immigrant settlement patterns
within states do not change significantly over
time in response to changes in economic con-
ditions and welfare payments. When the fixed
effects are not included, other variables proxy
for the unchanging settlement patterns of immi-
grants. The only variable that appears to affect
the number of immigrants settling in a state over
time is the stock of previous immigrants.
Using other measures of welfare gener-
osity, such as SSI and Medicaid, yields results
similar to those reported in Table 2. The loca-
tional choices of older immigrants are more
likely to depend on SSI benefits, for which the
impoverished elderly qualify, than on AFDC 
levels, which require the presence of depen-
dent children in the household. When equation
1 is estimated using the combined maximum 
SSI and food stamps payment for an indi-
vidual living alone as the measure of welfare
benefits, the results do not indicate that the
number of immigrants depends on SSI pay-
ments when the presence of other immigrants
and fixed effects are controlled for.
12 Similarly,
the results do not change when average
Medicaid benefits are added to the maximum
AFDC and food stamps benefits.
13 After fixed
effects are controlled for, only the percentage 
of the population that is born in the same 
country is significantly correlated with the num-
ber of immigrants.
The results are also robust to modifying
the dependent variable in order to examine the
determinants of the distribution of new immi-
grations across states. Equation 1 was estimated
using the fraction of all immigrants from a 
country going to a state instead of using the
number of persons immigrating to the state, or
where all variables are as defined above. This
dependent variable may better capture the
determinants of immigrants’ settlement patterns
( )
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A Model of Locational Choice
This box presents the derivation of the empirical model, which is based on indi-
viduals (or households) choosing the utility-maximizing location.The specific desti-
nation chosen by an immigrant depends on a multitude of characteristics, including
those of the individual, the individual’s country of origin, and all potential destina-
tions. An individual should choose the utility-maximizing location, which depends on
location-specific amenities, individual characteristics, and previous location. Using
similar notation to that of Blank (1988), individual i’s expected utility in location k at
time t, given that the individual lived in location j at time t – 1, can be expressed as
(B.1) Uijkt = U(Xikt, Fijkt, Djk),
where Xikt is location-specific amenities in location k at time t. Xikt includes variables
that affect an individual’s expected income, such as average earnings, the unemploy-
ment rate, and welfare benefits. Fijkt is a vector of household characteristics that affect
a person’s utility of living in location k at time t, given that the person lived in j at time
t –1.These characteristics do not change across locations but may be associated
with different utility levels across locations. For example, a person from the Philippines
will likely have higher utility living in a location where other Filipinos live. Djk reflects
time-invariant monetary and psychological costs of moving from location j to location
k, which are assumed to be expressible in the same utility units as Xikt and Fijkt.
Research on individuals’ locational choices typically assumes that utility can be
expressed as a linear combination of variables, or
(B.2) Uijkt = Xikt a + Fijktb + Djkg + eijkt ,
where eijkt is an error term assumed to be orthogonal to the covariates.
A person chooses the utility-maximizing location at time t, conditional on living 
in location j at time t – 1.The conditional probability of individual i choosing location
k from N possible locations is then
(B.3) Pr(kit|jit – 1) = Pr(Uijkt = MAX(Uij1t, Uij2t, . . ., UijNt)).
A multinomial logit model is usually used to estimate the effect of location-specific
amenities, individual characteristics, and previous location on the probability that an
individual chooses a certain location.
The above model can be used to estimate determinants of individuals’ locational
choice, but in this article I use aggregate data on immigration levels to the United
States. Equation B.3 can be aggregated across individuals to generate a model that
can be applied to aggregate data.The number of individuals moving to a location is
the number of individuals whose utility is maximized at that location, or
(B.4) Ijkt = å Pr(Uijkt = MAX(Uij1t, Uij2t, . . . , UijNt)),
i
where Ijkt is the number of immigrants moving to location k from location j at time t.
The number of immigrants moving to a location is assumed to be a linear function of
the variables that affect individuals’ locational choice, or
(B.5) Ijkt = Xkt a + Fjktb + Djkg + hjkt ,
where hjkt is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates.The
model estimated also includes state, time, and country-of-origin fixed effects in some
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among the states, conditional on immigrants’
decisions to come to the United States, because
it avoids any level effects associated with the
large differences in the number of immigrants
across countries.
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As shown in Table 3, the results do not
change. After fixed effects are controlled for,
only the foreign-born percentage of the popula-
tion is well correlated with the percentage of
immigrants settling in a state.
The regression results thus indicate that
welfare benefits do not affect the number of
new immigrants settling in a state. These results
are robust to a variety of sensitivity and speci-
fication checks discussed in the appendix. 
The percentage of the population comprised 
of earlier immigrants from the same country is
the only factor that affects immigrants’ loca-
tional choices over time. However, the effect 
of welfare payments on locational choices may
differ across immigrants based on their country
of origin. This possibility is investigated next.
Differences across immigrants
To test whether the effect of welfare on
locational choices differs across immigrants based
on their country of origin, variables interacting
country-of-origin dummy variables with the wel-
fare variable were included in equation 1. The
specification also included all the variables meas-
uring state-level economic and demographic
conditions, including the foreign-born variable,
the distance variable, and the fixed effects.
The results indicate substantial differences
across immigrant groups. As shown in Table 4,
welfare benefits are positively correlated with
the number of immigrants from China, El
Salvador, the Philippines, the former Soviet
Union, and Vietnam. The coefficients for China,
the Philippines, and Vietnam are significant 
at the 5 percent level, and the other two are 
significant at the 10 percent level. Except for
persons from the Philippines, these immigrants 
are more likely than other immigrants to be 
converting from refugee to legal permanent-
resident status, a finding that raises the possi-
bility that refugees’ locational choices are 
influenced by welfare even though immigrants’
choices are not. Refugees are more likely than
nonrefugee immigrants to participate in the 
welfare system (Borjas 1994), so it is not sur-
prising that their locational choices are more
responsive to differences in welfare payments
across states.
Other interesting findings include the 
estimated coefficient for immigrants from
Mexico, which is the largest in magnitude but is
Table 3
Determinants of Immigrants’ Destinations
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment rate .298 .248 .042 .042
(.064) (.056) (.075) (.071)
Income .904 .460 1.414 2.500
(1.024) (.981) (2.870) (2.738)
Metropolitan population .085 .065 –.028 –.026
(.010) (.008) (.098) (.093)
Taxes –.002 –.002 –.001 –.001
(.0004) (.0003) (.001) (.001)
Manufacturing –.062 –.031 .077 .067
employment share (.019) (.015) (.072) (.062)
Agriculture 2.073 1.541 –.197 –.171
employment share (.383) (.319) (.385) (.322)
Welfare .010 .008 .004 –.001
(.002) (.002) (.009) (.008)
Foreign-born population — 6.846 — 5.673
(*1,000) (1.142) (1.101)
Distance –.001 .001 –.001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .174 .322 .436 .536
NOTES: The dependent variable is the fraction of persons immigrating from one of eighteen
countries to one of forty-nine states in 1982 or 1992, a total of 1,764 observations. See
the text for details of the data. Heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are shown
in parentheses.
Table 4
Responsiveness of Immigrants to Welfare Differences

















South Korea 5.338 3.924
Former Soviet Union 7.573 4.034
United Kingdom –.362 3.885
Vietnam 15.289 7.098
NOTES: Shown is the coefficient on a variable measuring the maximum AFDC and food stamps
payment interacted with an indicator variable of country of origin.The dependent vari-
able is the number of persons immigrating from one of eighteen countries to one of
forty-nine states in 1982 or 1992. See the text for details of the data and specification.8
not significantly different from zero. The num-
ber of immigrants from Canada is negatively
correlated with welfare benefits. The F-test 
statistic of whether all of the coefficients dis-
played in Table 4 are equal is 3.37, which rejects
the hypothesis that they are equal at the 1 per-
cent level.
Conclusions
Much of the motivation for eliminating
most immigrants’ access to federally funded
public assistance benefits was concern that per-
sons migrate to the United States because of the
availability of welfare benefits. The 1996 welfare
law makes noncitizens ineligible for food
stamps and SSI payments and allows states to
discontinue AFDC, Medicaid, and other public
assistance benefits to noncitizens. Several states
intend to continue extending benefits to non-
citizens, whereas others are likely to cut off
benefits, widening the already substantial differ-
ences in welfare benefits across states. These
differences in policy create concern that immi-
grants will move in response to interstate differ-
entials and that states that continue to allow
immigrants to receive welfare payments will
become welfare magnets.
In this article, I find little evidence to sup-
port the contention that new immigrants will
choose their destinations based on welfare gen-
erosity. New immigrants are attracted to areas
with large immigrant populations. Because 
earlier immigrants are disproportionately
located in high-welfare states, it may appear
that high welfare benefits attract immigrants.
However, immigrants do not respond to inter-
state differentials in welfare generosity but
rather to differences in the sizes of the foreign-
born populations. Immigrants are also attracted
to a specific subset of states—namely California,
New York, Florida, and Texas—and do not
respond to changes in welfare benefits within
states over time. The recent historical evidence
gives little reason to be concerned that new
immigrants will choose their destinations based
on the welfare differentials created by the new
welfare law.
Notes
I thank Lori Taylor and Jason Saving for helpful 
comments.
1 Refugees are eligible for benefits the first five years
they are in the United States, and legal immigrants
who have worked in the United States for at least ten
years without receiving any federal means-tested bene-
fits remain eligible for federally funded benefits. The
eligibility rules for immigrants who have received U.S.
citizenship are the same as for natives.
2 Previously, the federal government partially reimbursed
states’ AFDC and Medicaid costs. The 1996 law
replaces these federal payments with block grants to
states, and the AFDC program was replaced by
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
3 See Hutt (1996). Current welfare statistics generally do
not distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants.
Although illegal immigrants have always been barred
from receiving federally funded welfare benefits, the rule
has not been enforced until now. Similarly, a provision
stating that the income of an immigrant’s sponsors is
used in determining an immigrant’s eligibility for public
assistance is now supposed to be enforced. The law
also requires states to report known illegal aliens to 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. States
can enact laws to continue benefits to illegal immi-
grants under state-funded programs.
4 Douglas Besharov, a senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute, quoted in Havemann (1996).
5 Adult males were present in less than 10 percent of
AFDC-recipient households in 1979, according to
Blank (1985).
6 The countries are Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, 
El Salvador, Germany, Guyana, Haiti, India, Iran,
Jamaica, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, South
Korea, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and Vietnam. The immigrant data are for fiscal years,
which run from October of the preceding year through
September of the given year.
7 The immigration data are from the INS publication
Statistical Yearbook. The data include the country in
which immigrants were born, which is assumed to be
the country of origin.
8 The unemployment rate and manufacturing employ-
ment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
publication Employment and Earnings. The income data
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis publication
Survey of Current Business. The metropolitan popula-
tion and tax data are from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census publication Statistical Abstract. The agricul-
tural employment data are from the BLS publication
Employment and Wages. The immigrant stock data are
from the 1980 and 1990 censuses.
9 All fiscal-year variables are lagged one year, and all
annual variables are lagged two years to avoid any
overlap in the time periods of the dependent variable
and the covariates.
10 The distance data were graciously supplied by Jeff
Gorham of the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Airline Statistics.
11 Any shock in the number of immigrants in a given year
will be reflected in the next census count of immigrant
stock; a linear interpolation of the immigrant stock will
therefore make the covariate correlated with the error
term. Although Buckley (1996) recognizes this prob-
lem and attempts to correct it using two-stage leastFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       9 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1997
squares estimation, the equation he estimates is
unidentified.
12 The SSI data are from the U.S. House Ways and
Means Committee. All results not included in tables
here are available from the author on request.
13 The Medicaid data are average payments per recipient
and are from the Statistical Abstract.
14 The variables interacting the country and time fixed
effects control for differences across countries in the
number of immigrants, but they also capture other un-
measured variables. The interactions are omitted in the
results shown in Table 3, but including them does not
change the reported results. A dummy variable for the
year 1982 (a time fixed effect) is included here instead.
The regressions results indicate that immi-
grants’ locational choices have not been affected
by changes in welfare benefits within states.The
estimated coefficients on the welfare variable are
imprecisely estimated, however, and may be sub-
ject to bias from several sources.The estimates
may be subject to multicollinearity or endogeneity
problems. In addition, a failure to control fully for
differences across states in the cost of living may
bias the estimates. Finally, California, a potential
outlier because of its large number of immigrants
and high welfare benefits, may be driving the
results.The sensitivity of the results to each of
these potential problems is examined.
Multicollinearity may underlie the large stan-
dard errors estimated for many of the variables,
making it difficult to determine what affects immi-
grants’ locational choice. An examination of the
correlations between the covariates shows that per
capita income, taxes, and maximum welfare bene-
fits are highly correlated.
1 Equation 1 was therefore
reestimated without the income and tax variables,
and the results are similar to those reported in
Tables 2 and 3.The welfare variable is not corre-
lated with the number of immigrants after controlling
for the stock of previous immigrants in equation 1
and fixed effects in equation 1¢.
2
The estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3
are also potentially subject to endogeneity bias
because the number of immigrants may affect state
economic conditions. In particular, policymakers
may cut welfare benefits in response to high levels
of immigration. If welfare and immigration are
simultaneously determined, the estimated coeffi-
cient on the welfare variable may be biased and
inconsistent. However, the specification estimated
here should not be subject to endogeneity bias
because the right-hand-side variables are lagged.
One of the usual means of correcting for endo-
geneity bias in a panel is first-differencing the data
and then using an instrumental variables estimator
in which the instrument is lagged values of the
right-hand-side variables (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and
Appendix
Sensitivity and Specification Checks
Rosen 1988).The method used here is a reduced-
form version of the same procedure.
Another specification concern is that equation
1 may not fully control for cost-of-living differences
across states that affect immigrants’ locational
choices. Equation 1 does not contain variables that
explicitly capture differences in the cost of living
across states or within states over time; however,
the state fixed effects control for time-invariant 
differences across states.To control more fully for
differences within states, equation 1 was reesti-
mated and a variable that measures the real median
rent in the state was included. Housing, the second
largest expenditure category for poor households,
is likely to be the largest source of within-state 
variation in the cost of living over time.
3 Controlling
for housing costs does not significantly affect the
estimated coefficient on the welfare variable in any
of the specifications.
The large number of persons migrating to
California and the state’s high welfare benefits 
may drive the estimation results that find a positive
correlation between immigration and welfare in
some specifications. Borjas (1996) finds that 
welfare is not correlated with the distribution of
immigrants across states when California is 
omitted from his analysis. If California is omitted
from the data used here, the results indicate a
weaker correlation between the number of immi-
grants and welfare.The estimated coefficient on
the welfare variable is not positive and significant 
in any of the specifications.
1 The partial correlation between income and welfare benefits is
0.50, and the partial correlation between taxes and welfare bene-
fits is 0.46.The Belsley condition number for the regressions
results reported in Table 2, column 2, is 27.6, which is above the
acceptable level.
2 The condition number for the equation corresponding to Table 2,
column 2 without the income and tax variables is 11.4, indicating
that multicollinearity is not a problem in the reestimated specification.
3 The median rent in a state is from the 1980 and 1990 censuses.
The average poor family spent more than 22 percent of income
on shelter in 1992–93, compared with about 16 percent for a
nonpoor family (Federman et al. 1996).10
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